

# **SOUTH AFRICA 1994-2011: (RE) CONCILIATION OF THE RAINBOW NATION DEFERRED?**

Public lecture read at the University of Innsbruck, Austria, May 2011

WESSEL VISSER

University of Stellenbosch, South Africa

## **A. South Africa under the Mbeki administration**

### **1. A National Democratic Revolution**

After the transition to democracy in 1994 it soon became clear that the 'miracle' of a negotiated settlement was, to a large extent, a result of the fact that the two main parties, the ANC and the National Party (NP), still knew little of the depth of their divisions. That was particularly true of what became known as minority rights, economic rights, economic policy and affirmative action. In meetings before 1990 between 'internal' South Africans and leading members of the ANC in exile, the ANC hinted at its radical programme, but many assumed that the party would come up against a tough NP government when proper negotiations started. No one anticipated that the NP would lose all power ten years later and would disappear ignominiously from the scene after another ten years. Resolving bitter conflicts over economic policy was the ANC's greatest challenge while the movement was banned and most of the leadership lived in exile. The most difficult issue was the economy. Nationalists and communists in the ANC alike propounded the theory of a National Democratic Revolution (NDR). In the first stage of this revolution the goal was to take charge of the political and economic system and from this base create the conditions for the transition to socialism, which was the second stage.

By the mid 1980s business leaders both in South Africa and Britain had begun working for a way out of the impasse in the bitter political struggle. They were keen on an 'insurance policy', should the apartheid regime collapse. Until the end of the 1950s the ANC model for democracy was what Nelson Mandela in the late 1980s called 'an ordinary democracy'. By this he meant the Westminster system based on parliamentary sovereignty and the winner-takes-all rule. From the 1960s the South African Communist Party (SACP) began pushing the ANC even further towards the democratic centralism of Eastern European dictatorships. A tight and unaccountable party elite allowed free discussion among the party elite until a decision was taken, which the leadership then

rigidly enforced. The legislature was largely reduced to a rubber stamp. A fusion of the ruling party and the state occurred that left little room for an opposition party. Centralism was the dominant feature.

Majority rule, however, meant something radically different in a homogeneous society, where social class interests and beliefs rather than racial or ethnic identity determined voters' choices. In societies deeply divided by race and ethnicity, by contrast, the ascribed identity strongly shaped the voters' affiliation. Invariably, as is the case in South Africa, this resulted in the largest racial or ethnic group in the electorate forming a 'permanent majority', using democratic terminology and mechanisms to exclude minorities as participants in decision-making. The NP government's secret polls conducted in the mid-1980s showed that the ANC attracted the support of four fifths of blacks, but these findings were never communicated to the white electorate. In talks during the 1980s the issue was raised that in many post-colonial African states state patronage and sheer intimidation prevented the evolution of a strong opposition. These discussants also failed to discuss the tendency of nationalist movements, once in power, to displace members of minorities from civil service jobs and to make the colonial language (e.g. English or French) an instrument for the dominance of the new ruling class.

At the so-called Dakar conference between progressive Afrikaner leaders and ANC exiles in 1987, an ANC spokesperson assured the former that the ANC could be trusted to take the interests of the minorities into account. Some ANC delegates even rejected a bill of rights seeking to safeguard individual rights and assuage minority fears, arguing that the Freedom Charter offered enough guarantees. They would not concede that speakers of a minority language should be entitled to enforceable language rights. According to Hermann Giliomee, Thabo Mbeki discovered at Dakar that non-binding assurances about a future ANC government fell on fertile soil.

A conference at Victoria Falls in Zimbabwe in July 1989 brought ANC office bearers, writers and literary critics aligned to the movement together with leading Afrikaans writers, poets and literary critics. The Victoria Falls conference produced abundant evidence of the demise of the Afrikaans nationalist movement that once had joined together people from all ranks and professions, including the most talented writers. The writers present tended to engage in a show of self-flagellation, bemoaning the fact that they were trapped in 'the production and reception system of the Afrikaans literary establishment' and losing Afrikaans readers for political reasons. It was almost as if they cursed the fate of being Afrikaans writers. Putting their political differences aside and keeping their agenda hidden, the ANC handled the groups from South Africa with great skill. The isolation of the NP government, which had long been the movement's objective, suddenly seemed attainable.

## 2. The NP during negotiations for a post-apartheid political dispensation

Patti Waldmeir, who conducted extensive interviews for her book *Anatomy of a Miracle*, suggested three reasons why the NP government failed to get a more balanced deal in the constitutional negotiations that took place between 1992 and 1996. First, the ANC out-manoeuvred the government, which procrastinated until the pendulum of power had swung against it. Second, the NP leadership was arrogant in believing that the party would fare much better in the election. Third, there was the element of vanity – FW de Klerk was desperate to prove to the outside world that he would not fail in securing a settlement.

No-one outside of the NP government or the business community thought the ANC would go as far as edging out 120 000 white civil servants by 2002 and would promptly demand representivity also in managerial positions in the corporate sector. Once in power with a massive majority, it pushed African advancement in the labour market much more rapidly and much further than the leadership itself had thought possible in the early 1990s. The NP thought that the negotiations were a mutually beneficial and stable settlement, one that the main parties would change only by mutual agreement. The ANC, by contrast, fought a classic ‘war of position’ in which each concession it extracted from the government became the platform for the next assault in what it called the NDR. It amended its position as the balance of forces shifted in its favour.

Some NP leaders believed that the ANC would find it impossible to govern without their assistance and co-operation. However, from their own party’s history they should have known how intoxicating a sweeping victory at the polls tends to be and how easily a ruling party forgets the claims and concerns of those excluded from decision-making. Among the NP leaders there was another factor that is usually ignored: sheer exhaustion. It was the result not only of relentless world pressure, but also of fighting the ANC and its allies – perhaps more importantly – the Afrikaner conservatives loath to take any risk.

## 3. Mbeki’s views on race

One of the legacies of apartheid has been a continuing obsession with race. According to Giliomee, there is no evidence that Thabo Mbeki, once he became Deputy President, remained particularly interested in the Afrikaners or the Afrikaans press. James Myburgh, who made a close study of Mbeki’s weekly electronic letter, states that there was no evidence that he took account of the Afrikaans press before 2005. But Mbeki made race a key concern the nearer he got to office. According to De Klerk, Mbeki thought more in racial terms – it was blacks versus whites. He indeed seemed never to have discarded the beliefs he expressed in his paper ‘The Historical Injustice’, written in 1977. He believed that whites, and Afrikaners in particular, clung to a pseudo-scientific racism, postulating a hierarchy of races with the Caucasians at the top and the Negro at a semi-animal level at the bottom.

By 1990 Mbeki believed in a market-driven growth as a prerequisite for redistribution. To his non-racialism he added calls for black solidarity against whites refusing to sacrifice their 'privileges'. In 1998 he made his most divisive speech that destroyed much of the spirit of conciliation and co-operation fostered and nurtured so carefully by the Mandela-administration: South Africa, he said, was a country of two nations. 'One of these is white, relatively prosperous...The second and larger nation of South Africa is black and poor...We are not becoming one nation, but two nations'. It was a speech aimed at dividing the nation racially rather than uniting it. It denied the extreme income disparities between the black elite and the growing incidence of white poverty. Throughout his presidency Mbeki seemed unable to discard his racial prism. He preferred Malaysia's state-driven New Economic Policy as a model for black economic empowerment.

For Mbeki the first part of the NDR plan was to establish a 'patriotic bourgeoisie' in the middle and senior levels of both the private and public sectors. The document 'Strategy and Tactics', tabled at the ANC's 50<sup>th</sup> National Conference held in Mafikeng in December 1997, proposed changing 'the doctrines, the composition and the management style' of the civil service, editorial rooms of the media, the judiciary, the army, the police and the intelligence structures. Another document, 'The State, Property Relations and Social Transformation' endorsed the notion that the state was 'an instrument in the hands of the liberation movement' to transform South Africa. Soon a National Deployment Committee was formed, which was charged with the task of deploying ANC cadres in all areas of society that the government considered necessary for transformation. At the outset Mbeki signaled that he would reject any criticism of affirmative action as racist. In the post-apartheid era race is being used to advance black middle-class interests – that is the primary objective of what is known as 'transformation' and 'empowerment'. The survival of apartheid's fourfold racial categorization (Africans, Europeans, Coloureds and Indians) is another ironic carry-over from the past.

Secondly, he broke with Mandela's reconciliation policy. A collective headed by Mbeki wrote Mandela's Mafikeng speech in which he accused the 'white' opposition parties of propagating 'a reactionary, dangerous and opportunist position' and of thinking that they had 'a democratic obligation merely to discredit the ruling power, so that they may gain power after the next elections'. James Myburgh showed how the ANC had moved within three years from Mandela's vision of an 'inspiringly united society' to the deliberate fostering of racial division. In the ANC's conception of democracy, as expressed in Mandela's Mafikeng speech, the state's main purpose was to advance the interests of the disadvantaged majority rather than serving all its citizens even-handedly. Thus the *demos* in the ANC's notion of democracy were, in fact, the African majority whose aspirations were 'hegemonic'. With the ANC leadership claiming to know best how to assert the 'hegemony of the people' and to advance its interests, ANC rule in practice became, in fact, a matter of government '*over* rather than *by* the people'.

#### 4. The position of Afrikaners and Afrikaans under the Mbeki administration

Mbeki as a student saw South Africa through the prism of the left-wing studies of the 1950s and 1960s that depicted the Afrikaner nationalists as reactionaries, fundamentalists and extremists. After 1994 the ANC soon realized they faced no Afrikaner threat. Not only had the transition gone smoothly, but no sane person could think that it could be reversed, given the sheer weight of black numbers and the lack of any threat from the old police and defence force. The ANC could afford to treat the Afrikaners with polite indifference, almost like the NP leaders had behaved towards the Bantustan blacks and their leaders in the apartheid state. The younger generation of the NP politicians had no experience of minority or opposition politics. General Constant Viljoen, leader of the (Afrikaner-orientated) Freedom Front, claimed to speak on behalf of the Afrikaners, but his party could attract only two percent support in the 1994 election and was soon ignored by the ANC.

In 2004, after a massive election victory for the ANC, a group of 112 Afrikaans-speaking businessmen, professionals and university principals sent a letter of congratulations to Mbeki stating: 'You have made it possible for all South Africans, including us as Afrikaans-speakers, to be at home in our country and welcome in Africa and the world'. The declaration contained no word about the uncertain position of Afrikaans at schools and universities. The delegations did not see it as their task to present Afrikaner concerns or grievances to government, but only to convey to the Afrikaans-speaking community the friendly reception they had received from government. There was a trade-off in the close relationship between government and the business community: the government gave business a conservative fiscal and monetary policy, which produced growth for a record 36 successive quarters since 1998. In return, big businesses expressed only muted words of protest against affirmative action. There was a tacit understanding that business would resist any opposition to the government's policies.

Afrikaner nationalism had been forged primarily through competition with the English in the 60 years after the unification of South African in 1910. What that rivalry gone, many Afrikaner businessmen came to assume the business identity of their English counterparts: individualistic and materialistic and showing little concern for cultural or community issues. They did not challenge the ANC's hegemonic project of celebrating the English language as the binding element of the national culture and the lingua franca of global capitalism.

Other Afrikaans leaders considered the displacement of white civil servants, the demand for 'access' to public schools and universities, the language policy and most of the symbolic changes as policies that targeted the Afrikaners or Afrikaans. Several towns in the northern provinces had their Afrikaans names replaced. Pretoria, founded in 1854, was to be changed to Tswane. Violent crime was rampant with close to 20 000 murders

reported per year. An ominous new development was (white) farm murders. Between 1991 and 2008 there were 794 farm attacks with a shocking 1 890 fatalities. Attack groups, usually coming out of a city, increased from five or seven men to 13 on average. The murder rate made farming in South Africa 'the most dangerous job in the world'. Government made only feeble attempts to address the issue and even disbanded most of the rural commandos, which leaders of organized agriculture saw as the most effective way of countering such attacks.

Afrikaners were dismayed about the disregard of Afrikaans in virtually all public and government institutions in spite of a Constitution that ostensibly promoted bilingualism. With the government seen to be moving away from the constitutional deals that had been struck, the Afrikaner Broederbond (AB) and other Afrikaans organizations began to press for minority rights. By that they meant mainly the implementation of the Constitution's clauses on language and, in particular, the right to instruction in any of the official languages, where feasible; the continued use of Afrikaans, along with English, as a language of record in the courts; and the powers bestowed on school governing bodies. In 1998 ANC Chairman Mosiuoa Lekota proposed talks specifically with the white Afrikaners about their grievances. The ANC National Executive Committee endorsed these plans, stating that the Afrikaners required special rapprochement, as they perceived themselves to be under threat. But in actual fact the ANC could offer the Afrikaners little. Its priority was to transform the civil service through affirmative action and to put pressure on the old Afrikaans-orientated Model C schools to offer instruction in English also in order to accommodate blacks. With the loss of power and the NP's steady disintegration after 1994, it became increasingly difficult to talk about a coherent Afrikaner community with a sense of common destiny. Many white Afrikaans-speakers, particularly business and professional people, refused to identify themselves with the Afrikaners.

There was no single organization that could speak for all Afrikaners on the rights of Afrikaans-speakers. Among the intelligentsia there were sharp divisions. On the one hand there were those who wished to open the gates for English in Afrikaans-medium institutions. This was done either under pressure from government or as a part of a strategy to increase the pool from which students and lecturers could be drawn. They argued that the Afrikaners as a group should not pick a fight with the ANC government but lie low while they rid themselves from the 'stain of apartheid'. If Afrikaners wanted to contest government policy they should appeal to individual rather than group or minority rights. On the other hand there were those who pressed for the mobilization of Afrikaans-speakers to demand their language rights under the Constitution, and in particular the right to instruction in any of the eleven official languages. They depicted English as the vehicle of a new form of imperialism, which disguised the attempt of the middle class to reserve the best jobs for themselves and their children. They insisted that the state had a constitutional duty to promote all eleven official languages. In 1999 24 Afrikaans intellectuals send a public letter to Mbeki, making the strongest demand yet

for minority rights. The letter pointed out that the government promoted English at the expense of all the other official languages. The marginalization of Afrikaans had given rise to apathy, alienation and disaffection among many Afrikaners. Large numbers had emigrated, resulting in a major loss of skills.

The same conflicts about language occurred in the state-controlled South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), but here market imperatives made it too costly to shun Afrikaans. Before the ANC came to power, English and Afrikaans television broadcasts, transmitted on the same channel, were allocated approximately equal airtime. In 1996, after an SABC policy change, the Afrikaans TV news bulletin was relegated to a lesser and infrequent time slot. Many Afrikaans-speaking viewers perceived these changes as a threat to the future of Afrikaans. Cultural organizations and Afrikaans newspapers exerted considerable pressure, but seemed to make no headway. What swayed the management was a loss of revenue. The television channels depended to a crucial extent on advertising during the evening news broadcast at prime time, which attracted large numbers of high-income viewers. The Afrikaans news drew almost three times as many viewers from the highest income groups than the English news. Many of the advertisers switched to Afrikaans newspapers, causing a sharp drop in SABC revenue. The amount generated by license fees, another important source of revenue, also started to drop as a result of boycotts. By 1997 Afrikaans license payers had decreased by more than 20 per cent.

Although the great majority of listeners or viewers preferred not watching or listening to the English channels, the Anglophone black management tried to build up the English TV channel as the main 'information channel'. English was used as the overarching language in news programmes. All planning for news occurred in a common forum – held in English – with the emphasis on the demands and needs of viewers who preferred English. Afrikaans radio and television were treated as subordinate 'ethnic' categories on a par with, for example, Xhosa and Zulu. These other services had to rely predominantly on translations of English copy, which were then supplemented by contributions from their own, limited teams.

In 1999 the SABC announced a major change in the scheduling of the television news in the evening. The Afrikaans and English news would both be broadcast at seven in the evening but on different channels. For management there was an unexpected twist. The English news, deprived of its Afrikaans viewer component, was the real loser. In terms of viewer numbers the Afrikaans news soon left its English competitor far behind. The new managerial elite at the SABC made the painful discovery that only a small proportion of their black viewers and listeners preferred English. The same thing happened with radio. The Afrikaans station of the SABC flourished and was by 2009 the most profitable of all SABC stations. The main English service suffered a sharp drop after 1994, with many listeners fleeing to the Afrikaans station. By 2009 the English station had not yet fully recovered. The plan of the SABC social engineers to make

English the great leveler of class and cultural distinctions had failed. As in the case of the universities and newspapers, the degree of support for Afrikaans was not determined by policy in the first place, but by the personal commitment of people in senior positions.

Another battle was waged around the preservation of Afrikaans as the single medium of instruction in schools and universities as the only effective policy to protect a smaller language competing against a universal language. Government policy accepted single-medium Afrikaans schools, provided such institutions were full. With Afrikaans-speakers forming a declining proportion of the population, filling up schools was not easy outside the cities. In some provinces officials delayed the building of new schools to put pressure on Afrikaans-medium schools to provide English-medium teaching. Although Afrikaans single-medium schools made up only three per cent of all state schools ten years after the transition, they attracted most attention from government for their alleged failure to transform. A combination of government pressure, parental choice and demographic changes caused the proportion of Afrikaans children attending Afrikaans single-medium schools to fall from over 90 per cent in the early 1990s to 60 per cent in 2004. In that year 14 per cent of white Afrikaans speakers went to English-medium schools. Afrikaans schools were also handicapped by the emigration and shortage of teachers, partly as a result of the state's failure to plan for a supply of Afrikaans teachers.

At university level the twin pressures of demography and transformation inexorably impacted on Afrikaans. The participation rate of Afrikaans speakers in tertiary education started to decline in 2001 from a point just below 50 per cent. From the mid-1990s Afrikaans universities began to broaden their intake from other communities. The main impetus initially was demographic pressure, supplemented after 1994 by government pressure. ANC policy, as formulated in 2002, insisted that South African black students could not be expected to study in Afrikaans at the former Afrikaans universities. Afrikaans could be the primary medium of instruction but not necessary the only medium of instruction. With no state funding for the duplication of classes in a parallel-medium system, the universities shifted the burden onto the lecturers, who considered it a 'language tax'.

By 2009 the promotion of Afrikaans students in the undergraduate student body of the different formerly Afrikaans universities had dropped sharply. Steady opposition started to come from alumni, students and Afrikaans cultural organizations. They grasped that dual medium and even parallel medium constituted a major threat to the long-term survival of Afrikaans. A survey of Stellenbosch students conducted in 2007 showed that more than 80 per cent of the Afrikaans students preferred Afrikaans-medium instruction or had no objection to it, but nearly half of these felt that the legacy of apartheid deterred them from pressing their language demands. By 2009 De Klerk stated that the government ignored virtually all the language rights in the Constitution. It did nothing to

develop the indigenous African languages and failed to fund the Pan South African Language Board sufficiently. The dream of eleven official languages enjoying equality of esteem turned out to be a mirage.

Coloured leaders would rebuff any approach by Afrikaans cultural organizations if there was a suspicion that they were being used merely to increase the numbers. Activists for Afrikaans as medium of instruction readily employed the term 'Afrikaans-speaking community' to refer to all Afrikaans speakers. There would, however, be no easy healing wounds or a coming together. Afrikaans speakers of all colours had been divided throughout history. Between 1970 and 1996 there was among Coloured people in the Cape Town metropolitan area a 'massive shift' of 7.4 per cent away from Afrikaans against one of 1.7 per cent for white Afrikaans-speakers.

For Afrikaners, and for all minorities in general, the ANC's huge election victories posed a challenge for which they were unprepared. The NP died ignominiously, the AB's membership dropped to 10 per cent of its peak and between 10 and 15 per cent of the Afrikaners emigrated for a variety of reasons, mostly as a result of the high crime rate. Most Afrikaner organizations opened their ranks, but few developed any ideological coherence. Big business was wary of supporting any project or organization that could irritate or annoy government. This elite stratum in the press and academic life was ready to offer only lukewarm support for Afrikaans and favoured 'progressive' values and political correctness in ways that were quite at odds with the preferences of the clients or readership they served. People who have become self-employed as businessmen, agents or consultants tended to be politically apathetic. People in senior positions withdrew from most forms of participation as an ethnic or interest group, in the process effectively decapitating the community.

By contrast the Mine Workers Union transformed itself into a diversified unionised labour service movement under the name Solidarity and in the process became a highly respected institution in challenging discrimination against workers in the 'minority communities'. Afrikaans music, theatre and literature flourished and were among the most vibrant on the continent. In many ways this was due to the liberation from apartheid and the stifling embrace of the state. However, the withdrawal of state patronage from the arts forced creative artists and writers to turn first to the mass market. Among the intelligentsia there were fundamental – and paralyzing – divisions between those Afrikaners who wished to assert minority and language rights for all, regardless of colour, and those who cared little about giving Afrikaans a secure place in schools or universities. Afrikaans-speakers did form a 'reading community', but there was very little coherent political or intellectual leadership, and very few proposals for collective action came from newspapers, universities or the host of other Afrikaans organizations.

## 5. Mbeki and affirmative action

Implementing the policies proposed in 'Strategy and Tactics' meant first of all the rapid Africanization of the civil service with 'loyal cadres' being deployed to strategic positions. Some 117 000 white civil servants left their positions between 1998 and 2000 after receiving compensation for leaving early. The great majority were Afrikaners. A massive loss of skills occurred, seriously affecting the capacity of government to deliver services. Towards the end of Mbeki's rule and throughout Jacob Zuma's administration huge and violent demonstrations and protests have appeared in black townships in airing residents' frustrations with the lack of service delivery.

The Employment Equity Act of 1998 established the much more radical goal of demographic representivity. In 2000 the government passed the Promotion of Equity and the Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act that aimed to promote outcome-based equality. The reach of these acts was bewildering. For instance, an Afrikaans welfare organization ran the risk of losing state subsidies if its board and management were not demographically representative. In 2005 the Gauteng Department of Social Development stated that subsidies for organizations working among poor whites would be phased out unless they immediately also started work among blacks and made the staff of these organizations 'representative.'

In July 2000 delegates to the ANC's National General Council, now including a large number of senior civil servants, were told that the 'principles of Democratic Centralism' continued to guide the ANC structures and that they had 'a responsibility to abide by, defend and implement' the decisions of the party leadership. The report therefore called for a deepening of party control within the civil service and an expansion of the scope and reach of 'state transformation' within 'the security forces, the judiciary, parastatals and regulatory bodies'. In terms of the 1998 legislation one economic sector after the other adopted its own Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) charter. In the financial sector, for instance, numerical targets were set for black representation on the board and the executive, and for jobs in the senior, middle and junior ranks of companies. In the wake of the legislation there was a frenzy of BEE deals. Invariably the beneficiaries belonged to a very narrow stratum of black individuals well connected to government and often related to one another. The great beneficiaries were the ANC as a party, which had succeeded in creating an elite of black managers in the public and the corporate sectors beholden to it, and a small cadre of spectacularly rich businessmen whose appetite for pork-barrel largesse seemed to be insatiable. The large corporations also benefited. By selling off a share of their business and appointing blacks in some executive positions without, however, relinquishing management control, these corporations deftly deflected a possible assault on the capitalist system. But there were high costs for the country: the BEE corporations seldom added value and representivity forced many well-qualified whites to seek work in specialized niches in the economy or emigrate.

## 6. The demise of the NP

In 2004 the ANC swallowed the NP hook, line and sinker in an unseemly act of crass opportunism. Tensions had long built up within the Democratic Alliance (DA), between a small NP faction under Marthinus van Schalkwyk, and the bulk of the party under Tony Leon. In secret negotiations Lekota and Van Schalkwyk agreed on a pact to co-operative government long before the latter told the NP's provincial leaders. Van Schalkwyk's strategy, conceived with the concurrence of Lekota, was for the government to pass a law that would make it possible for the NP's elected representatives to cross the floor and join the ANC. This gave the NP leader the power to act against any NP representative who rejected the decision to cooperate with or join the ANC. The NP would stand in the 2004 election on the ticket of cooperative government with the ANC.

The NP fared abysmally in the 2004 elections for the national and provincial governments, attracting only 1.7 per cent, compared to the 69.7 per cent of the ANC and 12.4 per cent of the DA. It had won a mere 258 000 votes against the 10.8 million of the ANC. The embattled Van Schalkwyk now seized his chance, forgetting all the promises to the electorate that the NP would retain a distinctive identity under the scheme of cooperative government. On 5 June 2004 he persuaded the NP's Federal Council to agree to the NP becoming 'part of the greater ANC movement'. In the 2006 local government election the ANC scored handsomely, winning control of the Western Cape provincial legislation and also of several city councils in the Western Cape, including the great prize of Cape Town. It would soon forget the clauses in the formal agreement with the NP that the 'spirit of participatory governance' would be reflected in appointments at both national and provincial levels and was a 'long-term commitment beyond 2004'. Apart from a cabinet post to Van Schalkwyk, the NP received only crumbs: two deputy ministers, an ambassador and two consul-generals.

Of the seven NP members of Parliament who crossed over in terms of the agreement, only Van Schalkwyk was placed high enough on the ANC list in the 2009 election to retain his seat in Parliament. He also retained his ministerial position. In its death throes the party seemed capable of little more than advancing its last leader's career. It was, according to Giliomee, a prostitute's funeral for a party that once had been the vanguard of the Afrikaner nationalist movement.

## 7. Socio-economic issues

By 2009 the number of whites dropped to below ten per cent of the population and white Afrikaans-speakers to six per cent. Afrikaans-speakers' spending accounted for 28 per cent of the country's domestic expenditure. But English had become the dominant language in government, politics, business and professional life. The most spectacular change since 1994 was the dramatic growth of a multiracial middle class. In 2008 it comprised 18 per cent of the population, if the middle class was taken to include all

families with an annual household income of above R11 000 per month. For the first time there were more blacks (43 per cent) than whites (42 per cent) in this class. The civil service for the first time reflected the population composition. At the top levels of the labour market black men on senior level in the private sector increased from 17 per cent to 23 per cent and black women from 5 per cent to 10 per cent. Representation of black people at the professional level increased from 31 per cent in 2002 to 46 per cent in 2008. White men's representation decreased in the same period from 47 per cent to 33 per cent and white women from 20 per cent to 18 per cent.

Another equally dramatic development was the shift from salaried employment to entrepreneurship among whites in the top income brackets. In 1994 75 per cent of the white population earning over R500 000 per year were formally employed, receiving salaries and bonuses. By 2009 this figure had been completely reversed and 75 per cent of whites in this income category were self-employed, either as owners of a business or as consultants or agents. Most whites with a regular income had indeed managed to do well, and those in the higher income brackets did spectacularly well. By 2007 the income gap between whites and blacks began widening again. Large numbers of well-qualified whites had been squeezed out of the public sector and the large corporations, but they were finding niches in the technology and services sector.

Other far-reaching changes had also occurred. South Africa was now much better integrated into the world economy. The proportion of companies under foreign control listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange rose from 1 per cent to 33 per cent in 2009. Better integration in the world economy along with other major pressures impacted on South Africa. The country experienced large-scale urbanization and proletarianization, the 'apparently irremediable pauperization' of more than half of the population as a result of chronic unemployment, a large influx of immigrants from the north, rising xenophobia among workers, an Aids pandemic and the devastation of the environment. What made this 'ordinary country' exceptional was the incidence of violent crime, including 45 murders per day and the fact that most of the fixed assets and investment capital belonged to whites.

In some ways the settlement between the NP and the ANC worked out better than expected. The management of the economy was excellent and abundant new opportunities opened up in the private sector and abroad for the resourceful. During the first two decades in power the ANC government made giant strides in delivering much needed public goods and services. The press was freer than anyone had expected. Despite growing protests against poor service delivery, the state was considered legitimate in the eyes of almost all the people.

But in other ways the bargain that was seemingly struck in 1993-1996 turned out to be quite different from what Afrikaners had assumed it to be. They had thought that the minorities would largely be left in peace by the government. Now it appeared that, while they would not be subjected to any persecution for their political views, their opinion did

not count for much. They had assumed that as the main ratepayers they would retain a reasonable measure of control at municipal level, but they were soon confronted with a growing loss in the capacity of the state to deliver services. In 2007 the ANC stated that at any one time more than 40 per cent of the technical positions at municipalities were vacant. The authorities kept these posts vacant if no suitable black person was available, preferring affirmative action to service delivery. In both the police and justice departments a rapid loss of skills occurred, with the result that the alarmingly high rates of violent crime continued unabated, and few people, black or white, felt safe.

The tax burden of the middle classes rose inexorably. In 2009 less than 10 per cent of individuals and less than five per cent of companies paid more than 75 per cent of all taxes. South Africa was the country with the highest social welfare spending in the entire developing world (catering for about 14 million social dependents), making up almost 5 per cent of GDP. It was between two and three times as high as the highest spending in other countries. In his 2011 budget speech in Parliament the Minister of Finance, Pravin Gordhan, conceded that it would be unsustainable in the long term. The proportion of people living mainly on social grants as the main source of income rose from a quarter to a third between 2004 and 2009. The level at which people qualified was an income of \$9 per day, much higher than the \$2 per day recommended by the World Bank. The optimism about the Constitution being able to protect language and other minority rights had largely been dissipated. Although some victories were scored in the lower courts in cases relating to affirmative action and the right to instruction in Afrikaans, there was a reluctance to refer these cases to the Constitutional Court.

#### 8. Alienation and emigration

Among white Afrikaans-speakers the collapse of the NP and Afrikaner leadership in general provided the opportunity to build a party that was not ethnically based. The proportion of white Afrikaans-speakers voting for the Democratic Party and later the DA rose from 54 per cent in 1999 to 82 per cent in 2009. Compared to white English-speakers, Afrikaner respondents to the 2004 poll showed a much greater need for political solidarity and cohesiveness. They wanted a constitution that provided a place for them to live satisfying lives as members of communities. Many were angry and some even disaffected, yet showed no sign of an ability to develop networks for political mobilization. They had lost their faith in any Afrikaner political leadership and there was no common Afrikaner ideology. A gulf had opened up, on the one hand, between those members of the intelligentsia fighting for an adequate and secure place for Afrikaans as a language of instruction, and on the other, those who were prepared to open the door even wider for English, while stigmatizing opposition as a throw-back to an exclusive Afrikaner nationalism.

Emigration acted as a safety valve. Estimates differ, but the most authoritative one was probably that of the South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR), which put the

figure of emigrants at 850 000, the greater majority of whom were whites. Half the emigrants were Afrikaners.

#### 9. Mobilizing minorities

In the general election of 2004 the ANC drew more than 70 per cent of the voters and the opposition parties were in disarray. Afrikaners realized that they were without any power on a continent where the fate of powerless wealthy minorities had rarely been pleasant. Representivity, coupled with the ANC doctrine of African leadership, meant that the members of minority groups were prevented from reaching the top no matter how competent they were. White school-leavers were immediately confronted with the issue of race. In tertiary education government policy demanded far higher levels of achievement from them. The policy had resulted in the large-scale displacement of white civil servants. To meet their representivity goals, private companies scrambled to appoint blacks from the public sector. In the meantime, blacks suffered more than whites in the growing crisis in service delivery.

What seemed to count most for Mbeki, in the light of accusation from the opposition of reversed discrimination, was the unique suffering of blacks in South Africa and the humiliations heaped upon them. In one of his weekly newsletters he attacked minority rights as an approach based on the 'false, backward and racist thesis that racial and ethnic groups share common racial and ethnic political objectives'. In 2009 De Klerk said that, in negotiating a constitution, the NP did not envisage the ANC applying affirmative action and demographic representivity in an 'unconstitutional and racist' way. In 2008 the government introduced the Expropriation Bill, giving it extensive power to expropriate private property. The bill would confer on government the right to expropriate any property for the purposes of BEE or land redistribution, if this was 'in the broader interests of South African society'. Market value would not be considered in determining compensation, the award could not be contested in court, and the responsible minister would decide when it would be paid. The Expropriation Bill launched a new form of minority politics: a broad-based alliance, coupled with a press campaign, parliamentary speeches and the lobbying of foreign decision makers that ultimately forced the government to withdraw the bill.

Also among white South Africans, especially Afrikaners, there are growing signs of civil disobedience and the refusal to quietly remain part of the country's 5.6 million taxpayers while corruption increases. Over the past two years, in more than 280 rural localities, whites have organized themselves in the National Ratepayers Union, effectively paying their municipal taxes into trusts and setting up parallel structures of municipal service delivery. These localities have apparently experienced far fewer violent black municipal protests than elsewhere. This confronts the ANC with the spectre of a growing white and Afrikaner 'tax boycott' – a real nightmare for its schemes of patronage and its systems of social grants, paid out to 14 million poor recipients and a vital aspect of neutralizing black protest.

## **B. South Africa under the Zuma administration**

### **1. The election of 2009**

After the ANC had ousted Thabo Mbeki as party leader at its 2007 national conference Jacob Zuma became the new party leader and, consequently, the South African president. Confronted with widespread criticism about service delivery, corruption and the alienating of minorities, Zuma used the election campaign in 2009 to try and revive the spirit of the Mandela presidency. He made a special appeal to Afrikaners, but most Afrikaner commentators objected to this group being singled out in this way. FW de Klerk proposed a 'Credo of the Afrikaners in 2009'. He urged Afrikaners to insist on equality and oppose the new forms of racism manifesting themselves in unfair demands for affirmative action and demographic representivity. More than 80 per cent of the Afrikaners who voted in the 2009 election supported the DA, which proposed 'an open-opportunity society for all'. The DA pushed up its share of the vote from 12 per cent to close to 17 per cent. Initially the ANC attracted considerable support from the Coloured and Indian communities but by 2009 the party had lost most of this support. Although the ANC won 66 per cent of the votes cast, most potential voters were no longer enthusiastic enough to vote for it. In 1994 the ANC managed to draw the support of 54 per cent of the potential voters, but his proportion dropped to 39 per cent in 2009. Nevertheless, the gap between the ruling and the second biggest party was still among the largest in the world. The upcoming local government elections of 18 May 2011 will be a good indicator if the tendency of decreasing ANC electoral support is indeed sustained.

### **2. Factionalist policies in the ANC**

The battles for the ANC presidency between the third-term bid of Mbeki and Zuma before the ANC national conference in 2007 and the corruption scandal surrounding the role of then Deputy President Zuma and his financial advisor Shabir Shaik became the driving issues behind the emergence of brutal factional conflict, with each faction identified with a leading personality. These events led to the dramatic showdown at the ANC's national conference, the victory of the Zuma faction in party elections, the recall of Mbeki in September 2008 as state president and the formation of a splinter party, the Congress of the People (COPE), consisting of loyal Mbeki supporters (but excluding Mbeki himself), in November 2008. Internal ANC party conflicts, festering since the early 1990s, spill over to weaken state and civil society institutions. The legal system and the judiciary have come under sustained attack by some members of the ruling party who, wanting to protect their leader Jacob Zuma from prosecution for corruption, accuse the former leader of the party and president, Thabo Mbeki, of using state structures against party rivals.

The struggle for control over the various factions within the ANC's coalition led to a policy paralysis in the party and the government. Zuma's presidential style of governing

is to try and balance the interests of all the groups within the ANC coalition (e.g. the 'capitalists', the communists, the youth league and the women's league). It's often a case of 'no policy at all'. William Gumede argues that this paralysis within the ANC has the effect that apparently only those government departments (such as the Treasury, Trade and Industry and Economic Development, the Reserve Bank, the Southern African Development Bank and the Industrial Development Corporation), with strong, confident and technically competent leaders, supported by powerful inside-factions in the party, are making progress.

These intra-elite conflicts not only undermined the dominant political party but also eroded key institutions such as sections of the executive, Parliament, the courts and various democracy-enhancing institutions. The party's attempt to assert its hegemony through its 'redeployment policy' from the Mafikeng conference onwards, and the idea that the party members ought to control the levers of power throughout the society to accelerate transformation increased the patronage accessible to ANC members. Ideologically the dominant view in ANC political culture, enunciated in the NDR concept, is that the state serves as an instrument to transform society.

Competing elites in the ANC benefit from and take advantage of the mobilization of mass support to enhance their individual interests by gaining recognition and placing their interests on the political agenda, and consequently being rewarded with higher office. After decades of racial discrimination, democratic politics has opened up politics as a lucrative career. Thus the civil service has also been a site for patronage and bestowing political rewards. An ANC survey of members in the province of Gauteng, for example, indicated that most members joined between 1990 and 1994, and that some 42 per cent of ordinary members and 31 per cent of office bearers were unemployed. Many leaders in the ANC have moved into lucrative political or economic positions with no independent means of income, or high levels of education, or previous experience in governance or administration. They do however, have the skills of charismatic mobilisers and have used these in many instances to encourage social mobilization for personal gain and not to benefit the mass of supporters.

According to Reddy, the once enviable ANC seems to have lost its moral compass and has steadily unraveled organizationally when not pressured to do so by competing political parties or organizations. The political practice of the nationalist elite has moved dramatically from a politics of community service and values associated with popular struggle and self-sacrifice to self-seeking special interests. The party elite have become embroiled in a politics that offers the rewards of upward mobility. To retain state power, leaders inevitably gravitate towards populist politics, aiming to create a direct link with followers by making all sorts of promises and dispensing state favours and goods just before elections, which undermines impersonal rules and institutions in the long term.

### 3. The 2010 FIFA World Cup tournament

Tension rose when the media broke the news of the murder of the right-wing leader of the ultra-right AWB (Afrikaner Resistance Movement), Eugène Terre'Blanche in April 2010, allegedly by two black farm hands, just two months prior to the start of the FIFA World Cup tournament in South Africa. Terre'Blanche was always controversial as a demagogue threatening to 'reclaim the Boer's land', making racist remarks, and he even served a jail sentence for assaulting a black worker. Nevertheless, as a public figure his death still came as a shock, especially in the light of the increasing rate of farm murders. According to the SAIRR, race tensions appeared to have increased significantly since the Terre'Blanche murder. The Institute was also of the opinion that much of the racial rapprochement that characterized the first 15 years of South Africa's democracy was being undone, especially as a result of the increasing farm murders such as that of Terre'Blanche.

Various agricultural organizations and certain Afrikaner public forums such as AfriForum, ascribed such murders as a result of incitement by singing an old ANC struggle song at ANC meetings, 'Kill the Boer, kill the farmer'. The anxiety around this incitement seemed to have influenced opinions across the broader white community. In a still pending court case AfriForum is accusing Julius Malema, leader of the ANC Youth League, of hate speech, for frequently singing this song at ANC rallies. Malema and other ANC spokespersons' defense is that the song is part of the ANC's 'cultural heritage' and not literally aimed at killing white farmers, but the rural white farming community perceives it in a very different light. A call for calmness by the government, the new AWB leadership and the Terre'Blanche family, as the court case of the accused is still pending, did a lot to appease the feelings of the white farming community. Although it might also be an indication of the huge decrease of the popularity of the AWB among right-wing Afrikaners since 1994, there was also the fear that this much publicized incident might jeopardize South Africa's hosting of the FIFA World Cup tournament.

However, despite the fears and anxieties over violence, farm murders, increased racial tension between communities, and therefore concerns for the safety of the international soccer tourists, the 2010 FIFA World Cup tournament was a huge success to the surprise of the international community, if not to South Africans themselves. They adopted the optimistic pose while fearing the worst. Certain of the world's media were certain that the entire month of the tournament would be an utter fiasco. The British tabloids especially took pleasure in depicting the first World Cup in Africa as a disaster in the making in which tourists would need bullet-proof vests to brave games that would go off late if they went off at all.

Although there were few questionable issues that happened behind the scenes such as corruption and nepotism, the mismanage of World Cup resources by officials and the allocation of key positions to friends and relatives, there were no delays in terms of kick-

offs, each and every match started on time. For a month South Africa presented its best face, painted and ebullient, joyous and friendly, defiantly proud and desperate for international approval. A September 2010 survey of South African attitudes on the World Cup tournament revealed that 91 per cent were proud that the country could prove its critics and doubters wrong. Success, pride and unity were the three words mostly used by South Africans to describe the impact of the tournament on their country and 87 per cent had more confidence in South Africa's abilities.

#### 4. The Malema factor

According to Moeletsi Mbeki, the outspoken journalist brother of Thabo Mbeki, the ZUMA era 'has opened the door to populist demagoguery': leaders who use racial messaging, political militancy and rhetoric to whip up emotions and support. He was referring to ANC Youth League leader Julius Malema whose profile is increasing in ANC ranks. Malema was instrumental in Zuma's ascendancy to power at the 2007 ANC national conference to lobby support for ousting Thabo Mbeki from the ANC leadership. Therefore Malema's rise was no coincidence. Malema and the Youth League were responsible for the frenzy of mobilization that Zuma waged when facing corruption charges, leading ultimately to the prosecuting authority caving in and 'a political solution' to his legal troubles.

Paton claims that the ANC faces the same dangers that led other national liberation movements down the populist path. At its root are the tenderpreneurs – a class of people connected with the political elite who view the state and its resources as their path to the accumulation of wealth. Malema, with business dealings with municipalities and connections to a clique of politically connected business people in his home province of Limpopo, is the standard bearer of this class. For it, the continued accumulation of wealth hinges not on business acumen or good service, but on maintaining and growing political influence. The politics they espouse can be described as African nationalism, due to its strong anti-communist stance and emphasis on racial transformation of the state and ownership of wealth.

Malema also seems to be enamored by dictators and fascists. He has visited President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela and Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, the latter whose policies of land expropriation he admires. At some future point he is also due to visit Cuba. Some of Malema's favourite topics are the seizing of white farm land and the nationalization of mines. Recently he demanded 60% of the assets of the country's largest mining conglomerate, Anglo American Corporation. The more Malema challenges the old guard in the ANC and talks about nationalization, the more the populist elements within the party feel comfortable in remaining. According to Daniel Silke, Malema is tolerated within the ANC precisely because of this. He plays the role of populist vote catcher and can be relied upon to keep this body of younger more radicalized youth well within the fold. It is quite clear too, that his influence is too powerful simply to be left to the ANC leadership to regulate; they seem to cower in front

of him. Malema seems to be obsessed, first and foremost, with power and its accumulation; whether that be in the form of material wealth, or simply by using the constituency he represents to bully the ANC leadership.

##### 5. Surviving in a 'miracle country': where does South Africa stand in 2011?

In 16 years South Africa had moved from being perceived by the world as a 'miracle country' to becoming just an ordinary country. The capitalist system remained intact, only the managers in the civil service changed. Big business, the greatest beneficiary under apartheid, would occupy the same position in the new order and would be as reluctant to voice strong criticism. The political system followed the same route as that of the one-party dominant regimes in Mexico, Taiwan and Malaysia and many African states. Given the ANC's near-messianic claims as a liberation movement, together with the country's population composition, the electoral system that was chosen and the ambiguous Constitution that was drafted, there was very little chance of South Africa becoming a liberal democracy, where the rights of the minority were sufficiently protected and the optimal growth path was followed. As was predicted, elections continued to be a racial census, where people voted on the basis of their social and even ethnic identity.

Referring to the popular revolts in Northern African countries such as Tunisia, Egypt and Libya in February and March 2011, Moeletsi Mbeki, in a scathing attack on the economic policies of the ANC, claimed to predict that South Africa's "Tunisia Day" will arrive more or less in 2020 when the masses will rise against the government. The year 2020 is when China estimates that its current minerals-intensive industrialization phase will be concluded. For South Africa, Mbeki argues, this will imply that the ANC government will have to cut back on social grants, which it uses to placate the black poor and to get their votes. China's current industrialization phase has forced up the prices of South Africa's minerals, which has enabled the government to finance social welfare programmes. The ANC inherited a flawed, complex society it barely understood and its tinkering with that society is turning it into an explosive cocktail. The elimination of agricultural subsidies by the government led to the loss of 600 000 farms workers' jobs and the eviction from the commercial sector of about 2.4 million people between 1997 and 2007. A wise government would have persuaded the skilled white and Indian population to devote some of their time to train the black and Coloured population to raise their skill levels.

What the ANC did instead when it came to power was to identify what its leaders and supporters wanted. It then used South Africa's strengths to satisfy the short-term consumption demands of its supporters. In essence, what is called Black Economic Empowerment, or BEE, promotes a number of extremely negative socio-economic trends in South Africa. It promotes a class of politicians dependent on big business and therefore promotes big business interests in the upper echelons of government. Secondly, BEE promotes an anti-entrepreneurial culture among the black middle class

by legitimizing an environment of entitlement. Thirdly, affirmative action, a subset of BEE, promotes incompetence and corruption in the public sector by using ruling party allegiance and connections as the criteria for entry and promotion in the public service, instead of having tough public service entry examinations.

Mbeki is also critical of big conglomerates accusing them of taking their marginal assets, and giving them to politically influential black people, with the purpose not to transform the economy but to create a black political class that is in alliance with the conglomerates and therefore wants to maintain the status quo of the economy and the way in which it operates. This promotes inequality between citizens by creating a large, marginalized underclass. The second problem with the formula of BEE is that it does not create entrepreneurs. Political leaders and politically connected people were given assets which they don't know how to manage therefore not adding value. BEE thus creates a class of idle rich ANC politicians. Mbeki's quarrel with BEE is that what the conglomerates are doing is to develop a new culture in South Africa – not a culture of entrepreneurship, but an entitlement culture, whereby black people who want to go into business think that they should acquire assets free, and that somebody is there to make them rich, rather than that they should build enterprises from the ground.

Black companies could not be built if black entrepreneurs are looking forward to the distribution of already existing assets from the conglomerates in return of becoming lobbyists for the conglomerates. The third worrying trend is the ANC-controlled state has internalized the BEE model and is distributing jobs to party faithful and social welfare to the poor. This is a recipe for incompetence and corruption, both of which are endemic in South Africa. It also explains the service delivery upheavals that are becoming a 'normal' part of the South African environment. In order to develop South Africa, instead of shuffling pre-existing wealth, new entrepreneurs have to be created with the support of existing entrepreneurs to diversify into new economic sectors.

Some aspects of Mbeki's criticism of ANC economic policy are echoed by others. One of the most pungent internal criticisms on ANC policy came recently from Zwelinzima Viva, the general secretary of COSATU, the country's biggest trade union federation and a partner of the ANC in the Tripartite governing alliance. According to Vavi, the ANC was 'infected with corruption and greed' and will perform dismally in the upcoming local government elections of May 2011 if the governing alliance would not act drastically against corruption: 'We are heading rapidly in the direction of a full-blown predator state in which a powerful corrupt and demagogic elite of political hyenas increasingly controls the state as a vehicle of accumulation'. In this 'predatory state' a new tier of leaders believed it was their turn to 'feed'. In an ordinary predatory state there is order in the feeding trough. The first family must feed first, and then the cabinet must come, and its family, and then the provincial leadership and the councils. When people like us [ordinary ANC members] reaches the trough there is nothing left, not even the bones that fall from the master's table'.

Economic commentators such as Piet le Roux argue that the total tax return in South Africa is one quarter of the GDP. By 2011 more than one out of every ten people works for the state so that ultimately the state is becoming its own job creator. In 2000 the average income of a civil servant was 12 per cent higher than that of someone working in the private sector; in 2010 it was 44 per cent higher. Salary allotment for civil servants doubled from R156 billion to R314 billion – almost one third of all state expenditure. The government's prescriptive labour regulations are making life increasingly difficult for private sector employers to employ workers because employers are expected to pay employees more than the value of their contribution to these companies. Once employees are employed, they can only be dismissed with great difficulty. Consequently the labour demand decreases and low-skilled and low-wage labourers are the hardest hit. Small enterprises in particular are being paralysed by these stifling labour regulations.

In 2010 a survey of the Institute for Justice and Peace revealed, inter alia, the following disconcerting findings about post-apartheid South African society: Strained race relations persist. The percentage of persons who agree that there is an improvement of relations between various races decreased from 61 per cent in 2006 to 49 per cent in 2009. Optimism over a shared future decreased with 24 per cent. Between 2003 and 2009 there was no significant improvement in inter-group socialization and contact. On the contrary, almost half (46 per cent) of the population never socialize with people of other races or groups and 59 per cent claims it is difficult to understand the customs and ways of other groups. Inequality remains of big stumbling block and the biggest divisive factors in South Africa are (in ranking order) economic inequality, political parties, class, disease such as AIDS, religion, race and language.

On the other hand Frans Cronjé of the SAIRR sees developments in a more positive light. According to Cronjé estimates indicate a growth in the GNP of more than 4 per cent by 2013-2014 which means that South Africa will still generate enough income to finance its expenditure. Fixed deposits as a proportion of GNP remain on 23 per cent which is higher than that of Brazil and only three percentage points lower than Russia's GNP. The prime rate decreased from almost 20 per cent in the middle 1990s when the ANC came to power to less than 10 per cent in 2011. Despite demonstrations against poor service delivery surveys indicate a significant increase in the number of households that have access to various services. The number of households living in formal housing increased since 1996 with 73 per cent (4.2 million households). Similar increased access also took place in terms of electricity, clean water, sewage systems and communication infrastructure.

Spectacular strides were made in the tertiary education sector in the past twenty years. In 1991 white South Africans obtained 20 business degrees for every one by black South Africans. In 2011 the ratio is 1:1. In engineering the ratio used to be 44:1 and in 2011 it is 1:1 which point to the huge potential being created in the rising black middle

class. The average annual per capital income in South Africa increased with 201 per cent since 1996. The income of black people increased with 235 per cent. White South Africans' income increased in the same period with 217 per cent despite their misgivings over employment equity legislation and affirmative action regulations. South Africans are wealthier today than ever before. More than ten political parties are being represented in Parliament and public institutions criticize the governing ANC regularly. This indicates that society remains politically free and open on various terrains and that the country's future is still being determined by voters' choice.

Perhaps the coined phrase of a 'rainbow nation', in the light of developments in South Africa since 1994, was somewhat premature. The renowned South African statesman, General Jan Smuts, used to say that 'the worst, such as the best, never happens in South Africa'. This might be a debatable point, but it seems clear that the future of post-apartheid South Africa will probably be determined by socio-economic and political developments within the next decade. Whether one perceives South Africa's future in a positive or negative light it is apparent that South Africans as a democratic nation are now only taking the first wavering steps on its long post-apartheid walk with a steep learning curve. We are indeed living in very interesting and exciting times.

## Sources

Bogopa, D: "Perspectives on the World Cup Tournament in South Africa, in Impumelelo – The Interdisciplinary Electronic Journal of African Sports, <http://www.ohio.edu/sportsafrica/journal/Volume6/bogopareflections.htm> [accessed 5.11.2010].

Caldwell-Barr, M: "Julius Malema flirting with fascists", in Llewdlac's Blog Looking at the political situation in South Africa, 22.4.2010, <http://llewdlac.wordpress.com/2010/04/22/the-ancyl-demagogues-and-dictators-tour-...> [accessed 29.4.2010].

Catsam, DC: "Ayoba!: Reflections from South Africa's World Cup", in Impumelelo – The Interdisciplinary Electronic Journal of African Sports, <http://www.ohio.edu/sportsafrica/journal/Volume6/catsamreflection.htm> [accessed 5.11.2010].

Cronjé, F: "SAIRR Today: Press Release: Statement by the South African Institute of Race Relations on the ramifications of the killing of Eugène Terre'Blanche – 6<sup>th</sup> April 2010, <http://www.sairr.org.za/sairr-today-press-release-statement-by-the-south-a...> [accessed 29.4.2010].

Cronjé, F: "Vat 10, Suid-Afrika!", in *Die Burger*, 12.1.2011, p.11.

De Lange, J: "ANC-alliansie 'is met rug teen die muur'", in *Die Burger*, 6.4.2011, p.2.

Giliomee, H: "The ANC and Afrikaners" (New augmented chapter to *The Afrikaners. Biography of a People*, publication forthcoming).

Giliomee, H and Mbenga, B (eds): *Nuwe Geskiedenis van Suid-Afrika*, Tafelberg, Kaapstad, 2007.

Gumede, W: "Stryd om die stoel", in *Die Burger By*, 31.7.2010, p.4.

Le Roux, P: "Begroting: Dié jakkals jaag mos sy eie stert", in *Die Burger*, 2.3.2011, p.12.

Maylam, P: "South Africa's forgotten centenary: Watersheds, missed opportunities and failed governance, 1910-2010". Paper presented at the History Department seminar series, University of Stellenbosch, November 2010.

Mbeki, M and Rossouw, J: "South Africa, time for change", in *Le Monde diplomatique* – English edition, <http://mondediplo.com/blogs/south-africa-time-for-change> [accessed 21.7.2010].

Mbeki, M: "Weath creation. Only a matter of time before the hand grenade explodes", in *Business Day*, 10.2.2011, <http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/Content.aspx?id=133902> [accessed 18.2.2011].

Paton, C: "Flirting with the demagogues", in *Financial Mail*, 7 May 2010, pp.36-38.

Pelser, W.; "Pasop, wit mans – Malema", in *Rapport*, 6.3.2011, p.4

Reddy, T: "ANC Decline, Social Mobilisation and Political Society: Understanding South Africa's Evolving Political Culture". Public lecture presented at the University of Stellenbosch, October 2010.

Silke, D: "Why do ANC voters remain loyal", in *Politicsweb*, 18.4.2010, <http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page7169?oid=17187...> [accessed 28.4.2010].

Spies, C: "'n Storm broei", in *Die Burger By*, 25.9.2010, p.4.

Van der Westhuizen, T: "Suid-Afrikaners trots oor land se WB-sukses", in *Die Burger*, 28.9.2010, p.6.

oOo