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PHILOSOPHY SEMINAR
Burke, Kant, Schiller, and the hidden source of sublimity
Two main points of difference between Kants aesthetic theory of sublimity and many other approaches of the sublime are firstly, that Kant makes a distinction between what he calls the genuinely sublime and the sublime in a broader but improper sense and secondly, that he seems to make a tight connection between this genuine sublime and moral ideas. To clear up these points, I compare Kant's theory of the sublime with Burkes and Schiller's, which were both known to him and to which he also dedicated some short remarks. The feeling of sublimity as a purely aesthetic feeling is different from the respect for the moral law. My thesis is that, although moral consciousness is, according to Kant, the transcendental precondition of the validity of judgments concerning sublimity and the criterion for what can be considered as genuine sublime, we are, within purely aesthetic judgments, not clearly aware of this distinction between genuine and improper forms of sublimity. When this distinction becomes a determining element in our judgments of the sublime, these judgments lose their purely aesthetic character. That is also the case with judgments of taste, if beauty is functioning as a symbol for morality. Our moral consciousness is authorized, on transcendental grounds and within borders determined by reason, to enlist the help of the imagination to represent moral ends and thus to sustain the will. In this function, however, aesthetic judgments are no longer pure but connected with teleological and moral concepts.
Speaker: Herman Van Erp, University of Tilburg
Date: Thursday, 31 March
Time: 12:30-14:00
Venue: Room 628,
6th floor, PhilosophY Department (Arts Building)
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PHILOSOPHY SEMINAR
HOW PICTURES WORK
Abstract:
In recent decades, depiction has become a very popular research topic in aesthetics. Given the prevalence of pictures in contemporary life and considering the wide variety of artefacts we intuitively take to be pictorial (ranging, for example, from high definition photographs to comic-book sketches to some instances of abstract painting) it is hardly surprising that questions after the nature and functioning of depiction would garner philosophical interest. What constitutes a picture? How does its form relate to its content? How do pictures differ from other representational signs (like words, graphs, maps, diagrams, etc.)? My paper takes stock of some viable answers.
After giving reasons for rejecting the common sense resemblance view of depiction, I explore the two main alternative approaches that have crystallised in the literature: the perceptual and structural approaches respectively. The former tries to define depiction with reference to our experience of pictures; the latter opts for a systemic focus and treats pictures as symbols in ostensibly pictorial symbol systems. Among proponents of the perceptual approach I argue in favour of a broadly Wollheimian position. It is my view that the most recent attempt at a structural theory of depiction, as proposed by John Kulvicki, is fully compatible and can be easily integrated with Wollheim's perceptual theory. I defend this view and suggest a small adjustment to Kulvicki's account. Finally, I suggest why I consider Wollheim's perceptual considerations as fundamental to an integrated account.
Speaker: Servaas Van der Berg
Date: Monday, 7 March
Time: 12:30-14:00
Venue: Room 628,
6th floor, Philosophy Department (Arts Building)
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PHILOSOPHY SEMINAR
How the Concept of Need Helps us to Help
Abstract:
In this paper I introduce my work in ethics, inviting ideas for links from philosophers and students working in South Africa. My research centre, the Centre for Ethical Philosophy at Durham University, was set up in 2007 to provide a forum for the development of helpful ideas using philosophy. In this paper I first describe the CEP method, I then discuss two examples - peace, and political practice - which I think may be of interest in the new South Africa. In 1. I set out the CEP philosophy and note related approaches. In 2. I consider the implications of my work so far for ethics. The main implication is that we should pay much more attention to the concept of need, which a patient-centred approach shows has actually evolved precisely to structure ethical normativity. In 3. I consider the implications for how to achieve peace. In 4. I consider what difference the recognition of passivity should make to political practice. In 5. I highlight implications for South African politics. In 6. I conclude.
Speaker: Soran Reader,Durham University
Date: Thursday, 24 February
Time: 12:30:14:00
Venue: Room 628,
6th floor, Philosophy Department (Arts Building)
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